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Remote Intimacies: technologies of the researching self 
 
From Aristotle we have received the fundamental stratum for understanding praxis in its 
relation to what he categorised as the three basic activities of human beings: theoria, poiesis 
and praxis. The telos, or end goal of theoretical activity was the disclosure or unconcealing of 
truth, and for Aristotle, techne, skill or know-how in production was one of the five modes for 
such disclosure. Poiesis refers to the making of a work, any work that requires techne or skill in 
its making, and hence its end was production.  Praxis was the process by which theory or 
know-how was practiced or enacted. In this sense, praxis concerns human agency in changing 
a world, with this world understood in theory, and altered according to skills or know-how 
in making. For Classical thinking, its concern focused on three domains: that of ethics as the 
ethos or habits of a people, that of economics, or the law of the household (nomos [law] of the 
oikos [household]) and that of politics, or the polis as gathering of the essential question of 
community. Hence, praxis had its agency in securing the building of a locale or ordered space 
of a people, its laws, customs and governance. 
 
Both techne and praxis have undergone considerable change in meaning since Classical times, 
as has our understanding of the securing binding of a people in the human agency of 
production. We derive the word technology from techne. However, it now primarily is 
concerned not with the know-how in making, but with the means to production as an 
extension to or of the self. From the late 19th century praxis has been closely associated with 
the philosophical and economic theories of Karl Marx. Marxism was also termed a 
“philosophy of praxis,” and often invoked strong critique of what was considered to be a 
naïve and instrumental understanding of the neutrality of technology within the Capitalist 
mode of production. 
 
This paper, Remote Intimacies, endeavours to look at contemporary understandings of 
technologies of production in relation to how the question of research and the question of self 
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Remote Intimacies: technologies of the researching self 
 
About two months ago I was at the launch of a new campaign by Auckland City Council to 
construct itself as the city of creative industries. Creative industries within our contemporary 
perspectives are high tech, if not cutting edge or world leading in technological innovations 
for the information and communication sectors, the entertainment industries, and the value 
adding to production we associate with the culture industries, such as the arts, fashion, film 
and multi-media. One of the four or five presenters mentioned what she understood to be the 
new catch-phrase for this still young millennium, the phrase “remote intimacy.” It initially 
struck me as an oxymoron, or a term whose two words in their conjunction only served to 
emphasise their incongruity. Perhaps only the most cynical of those who engage in smart 
communications technologies would actually use this term without an ironic edge. Perhaps 
… but, then, I have never fallen in love on second life! I want to explore this strange 
conjuncture a little, to see if in fact it does present an emergent horizon for thinking the 
relational possibilities for being human, or whether in fact it is much more prosaic, if not 
antiquated as that which has always constituted a concept of the self as a self whose relations 
to the world is fundamentally one of questioning, which is to say, as a self as researcher. 
 
The overarching theme of this postgraduate conference is techno-praxis, the place of technology 
in research. As I have intimated above, praxis refers to human agency, action or practice. The 
title to this event would suggest that a questioning of the praxis of technology, or what we 
could call human agency or practices with technology, implies or infers a question of place: 
how technology is placed in research. Or, where in research does one locate the 
technological? However, the title might also be read a little differently, with its hyphened 
techno-praxis suggesting that agency or practice is inherently technological; not that there is 
praxis that may implicate technology and a human agency or praxis that may not, but that all 
praxis is technological, and that this hyphened techno-praxis is the place of technology in 
research, that research as a human practice, whether theoretical, critical or applied, is bound 
to a particular place, or placement, located within the boundary established by praxis being 
inherently or essentially technological.  
 
So, from what we have said so far, on the one hand we want to think along the lines of 
questioning how human relations happen, how an intimacy happens with respect to 
distancing and nearing. We think of the intimate as that which is close, or brought close, 
hence that which was distant. In this sense remote intimacy presents its paradox, a paradox of 
remote nearness. And, on the other hand, we have two (at least) interpretations of the 
overarching theme of the postgraduate conference. Does the technological now determine 
human agency such that research as a human practice is always already given its place in the 
technological or is the question of place more open than this, and does the openness of 
“place” infer a less determinate role for technology? But, are these two series or lines of 
questioning already linked, already themselves deeply related precisely to the question of 
research. But, what is research? 
 
Clearly, there can be no one definitive answer to such a question particularly in the sense that 
each discipline, or even sub-discipline, may have such different suppositions concerning 
what this world is as that to be researched, the entities that may or may not be “discovered” 
and the methods or processes by which one may proceed. From my own experience on the 
University Postgraduate Board (former DSB) and the Ethics Committee, I am very much 
aware, even within the relatively small community of researchers constituting AUT that there 
are incommensurable paradigms at work in terms of research methodologies and the 
supposed entities that are available for research. Even with particular faculties of the 
university there are incommensurable research paradigms. For example, there are those who 
will establish their research methodology as empirical and those who will be 
phenomenological. As we are well aware each methodology in fact establishes in its 
differences particular claims as to epistemological frameworks and the resulting entities that 
may be knowable or implied ontologically. So, how can we approach this question “what is 
research” without simply presenting either the most general platitudes, or the most naïve 
dogmatisms? And will approaching this as a question help us at all in thinking more clearly 
the what or how of technology with respect to human practices?  
 
But a prior question occurs to me, prior to the question of research, or at least arises with that 
question. Is “research” a particular human activity fundamentally different from all others, 
and if so in what way might it be different? Certainly we want to emphasise that whatever we 
are, we are what we do. It is not that we exist and then begin to act in the world. We are our 
doing in the world, we are fundamentally praxis, our agency or practicing, and our “world” 
is our surrounding world of things more or less near or distant, more or less useful or useless, 
more or less understandable or not understandable. Moreover, because we are our doing in 
the world, we are always underway with this doing. It is not that we are and then get 
underway; our being is the under-way-ness of our projects, more or less complete or 
incomplete, known or unknown, both anticipated for what they (we) will be in the light of 
what they (we) have been. We are fundamentally futural, living in and as the incomplete 
project that we are. In this anticipatory existence, we anticipate or project ourselves into, for 
example, the end of this talk, into tomorrow, into the end of the year, into the end of our life 
and so on. This is us, our existing. In as much as we project, our existence is fundamentally 
open to possibility; we are our own possibility, uncertain, but not entirely haphazard or 
chancy. We live this open possibility that is ourselves. And along the way of this open 
possibility is what we might call experience and learning. 
 
In many respects what we call research is precisely this.  Or to put things differently, it is only 
because we in our everydayness are this open possibility to a future, that we have located a 
particular orientation to this openness that we name research. What makes research different? 
As anyone who genuinely experiments with their possibility to be would know, in relation to 
the openness of the future we can get a little lost, or entangled in things. This suggests we 
lose a connection between that open possibility and where we have been. The projection that 
encompasses the project is an ex-trinsic place to the one we occupy. Who has not lost their 
way a little in the eccentric questioning that encompasses genuine questioning or research? 
There is needed something that binds us to the openness of the genuine question, that does 
not close down the openness but enables us to follow its open path. This we call rigour in 
research. But we should not think of this “rigour” as a necessary adherence to a methodology 
that stymies genuine creativity in questioning. This is not the notion of rigour I am 
considering. 
 
Genuine research or questioning takes us from the familiar, from the domestication of our 
disciplinary boundary, from the family of patriarchs or matriarchs we variously identify as 
our supervisors or leading researchers in the field. I say “genuine research or questioning” to 
differentiate a disposition to open possibility from much of what we do or undertake as 
research, which is to rehearse as questioning answers that are all too familiar. We move into 
foreign territory but need to return what is foreign to ourselves; or rather we are the return in 
translation of what is foreign. From one language to another, from the presentation of a 
phenomenal world to the discursive regularities that encapsulate the relations of that world, 
from the obscure sheltering of an understanding of things to the clarity of an exposition, the 
binding of rigour happens in the self as translator. In this sense, one does not look so much at 
research as the novel and creative invention of a new thought or substance, but rather as the 
exquisite translation of what was always already there into a new prose of the world. This 
binding rigour is inherently creative, projective, anticipatory and incomplete, and to be 
considered as a particular case of our everyday engagement with the world. 
 
We now might begin to see that there are two predominant ways to think about research, or 
at least two ways, as there are probably many more. These would equate with how we think 
about what research supposedly delivers, that is, a better understanding of the world. We are 
already well aware of the two most traditional paradigms for approaching a questioning of 
things; one being what could be termed within particular discourses as interpretative and 
subjective, and one being its obverse, objective and definitive. These constitute the two great 
divisions of the humanities and the sciences that have dominated our sites if not seats of 
learning at least from the beginnings of Modernity, whether we variously mark that 
threshold from the emergence of Galilean science or some time later with the emergence of 
Kantian critique. What initially differentiated them in fact goes back at least to Aristotelian 
categories of truth, where the disclosure of truth fell fundamentally into two types: the truth 
of that which may be none other than as it is and the truth of that which may be other than as 
it is. The first category encompassed physis, or things in their essential nature; the second 
comprised that which was made by human beings. As things made, these things might not 
have been made or made differently according to particular design and know-how. These 
things were governed by techne as a predominant mode of disclosure, where techne referred to 
the rules or know-how for production. Certainly by Modernity research tended to be divided 
into that questioning whose arena was the essential nature of things, governed in a hierarchy 
of the physical sciences dominated by mathematics and physics and a questioning into the 
products of human labour variously divided between the arts and the human sciences, more 
or less caught in the undecidability of its methodological directions with respect to the 
exactness of the physical sciences and the interpretative frameworks of cultural productions.  
 
We started with a notion of remote intimacy and its paradoxical juncture of two terms. If we 
think of intimacy as a closeness or nearing, it is also a disclosing or opening. Equally, 
remoteness as a distancing, we could consider to be a concealing. Of course, this paradox can 
be though of as that of the question in itself or as such, the very question of the question or 
even the place of the question: how does one think that which is unthought, or what has been 
an outside to thought? How is the remoteness of what is unknown brought to the intimacy of 
disclosure? We also started with a question of the place of technology in research and the 
degree to which this place is an open possibility or already determined for human agency or 
practice. What was decisive for modernity, a modernity we are still entangled with, is 
precisely the place of technology in the resolution of the paradox of remote intimacy. How 
can we understand this? We can note two decisive moments that already emerged in the 
Renaissance: science, or the exact knowledge of the physical world becomes an instrumental 
science, a science of instrumentation: what bridges the infinite void between a conscious self 
and a world of things is the techne of instrumentation and measurement that supposedly 
extracts the mechanical laws of the universe. This moment is decisive in its break from 
Classical or Aristotelian thinking. If for Aristotle the disclosure of truth falls to episteme or 
science with respect to an essential and invariant nature to things, and techne or know-how in 
making with respect to things that might have been otherwise, Galilean science will afford 
the possibilities of techne in order to disclose episteme, certainly something that we, today, 
hardly find unsettling, though it would not have been possible for Classical thought.   
 
Coincident with this is the invention of perspectival space, or the representation of the world 
according to a geometrical order. Perspectival construction is a techne in which the infinite 
void separating the human gaze and the thing is bridged by a picture plane geometrically 
equidistant between the two vanishing points of self and world. This picture plane is 
immaterial, a virtual projection, neither self nor world but precisely the abstract model for 
representation itself, as that immaterial presentation of a world to a knowing self. In this 
sense, the world becomes picture. We initially encounter this virtualised and projected self 
formalised in Descartes’ cogito ergo sum, and then established as the modern self in Kant’s 
transcendental subject of representation. Certainly by the 20th century, the techne of 
instrumentation and the techne of world picturing became the instrumental technologies by 
which we had our guarantees of knowing. Physis, or the essential nature of things became 
that which gave up its truth technologically and instrumentally. And, as we are aware, the 
world became a resource for human production. Human being equally became a vital or 
essential resource for production. Human being equally became the object of an instrumental 
science.  
 
When the notion of remote intimacy was mentioned at that Auckland City Council function, 
the presenter was of course referring to the most contemporary information and 
communication technologies, to internet technologies, to virtual places or locations such as 
Second Life, My Space, U-Tube, Face-book, virtual worlds enabled by remarkable 
developments in digital technological innovation. We note the foregrounding within this 
event of the KAREN network provisions, essential for the most contemporary approaches to 
network research, the instantaneous transmission of data, real-time video-conferencing and 
so on. I want to emphasise something though, from what I have been saying: while these are 
new horizons of disclosure as to the possibility of human agency, what they most decisively 
disclose is their already concealed possibility in the very foundations to modernity that our 
Eurocentrically derived now global culture locates so readily. Authentic existence in the 
virtuality of digital screen spaces happens precisely because our fundamental understanding 
of experience itself has been, for at least 500 years that of a virtual plane of projection of the 
world; our knowing has been authenticated in the virtual spaces of representation as such. 
And our relations to what is, either with respect to things or human beings, has been 
mediated by instruments that extend the body, that are extensions to the body. 
 
It is interesting in this regard to consider two inventions at the end of the nineteenth century 
that became so remarkably decisive for our contemporary mediated existence, two inventions 
that were to be prosthetics for insufficient or deficient bodies: the typewriter and the 
telephone. The typewriter was invented as a mechanical writing keyboard for the blind, such 
that the blind could communicate efficiently and effectively in writing. Ironically, it was 
never taken up widely for this purpose.  However, it became the essential device in the 
bureaucracy of the emerging office worker, and became a major vehicle for the employment 
of women. We can of course trace the successive histories of that keyboard from typewriter, 
to computer, to mobile telephonics. The telephone emerged from experiments with enabling 
the deaf to hear. Again, ironically, it also became an essential device for the bureaucracy of 
the emerging office worker, but also for a phonics at a distance, a tele-phonics, a remote 
intimacy or remote connectivity. Of course the third coincident invention at the turn of the 
20th century was cinema, a realisation of a prosthetic screen of projection as representation of 
the temporal image which by the mid 20th century would become a tele-vision, or a seeing at a 
distance. If we read here a trajectory of bridging a distance, of a self’s experience or 
realisation of an elsewhere, it is not so much in the de-realisation of one’s place, as much as 
the realisation of the Other place, for one’s locale or place was necessarily bound to the site of 
the screen. 
 
One of the most common metaphors for the now ubiquitous screen is that of a window or 
portal, an opening onto an elsewhere, and indeed this is how we might have interpreted what 
I just said about the realisation of the Other place. It is as if we look through the screen and 
onto an elsewhere.  The screen itself disappears, falls into forgetfulness, along with all of its 
accompanying hook-ups: keyboard, cables, IT support staff, software licensing, viruses and 
so on. But we need to remember that “screen” is a noun and a verb. While a screen is enabling 
with respect to offering a perspective on things, it also frames, excludes and screens us. By 
this I mean that we cannot separate out the question of technologies, their place, the question 
of research and the question of surveillance and identity. We could already trace the 
coincidence of these issues with the emergence of Galilean science and perspectival space, 
though we can clearly register how in the 21st century identity and surveillance are contingent 
on the same technologies that construe our communicative possibilities and sense of place. If 
to research is to project into an ex-trinsic or ec-centric locale, to dwell in the foreign or 
remoteness of what is concealed or hidden, to what extent can we still say, along with Michel 
Foucault, it is not that everything is interesting but that everything is dangerous? By this 
question I mean to what extent do we recognise that the same technologies by which we 
undertake research, by which we assume we are ready to risk everything on a radical 
questioning, are precisely those technologies that shore up and guarantee our identity, 
reassure us that we are locatable, that the Other place is in fact recoverable eventually to the 
global itself. In short, while technologies are the contemporary mediums in which research 
happens, and technologies may also be the objects of research, to what extent are technologies 
recognised for the manner whereby they conduct us, survey us; provide us with our place 
and identities supposedly as the ones who know. 
 
AUT is called a “university of technology.” In a very real and most pressing sense, this is 
simply a truism, something that may say very little, in the sense that every university is a 
university of technology, whether named as such or not. Whatever institutional 
configurations we may want to name today, they are all institutions of technology, if by 
institution we refer precisely to the place where human praxis happens, where institutions 
are particular sites of human agency: familial, governmental, industrial, virtual, or universal. 
Praxis is techno-praxis, as there is no outside to the instrumental mediations of human 
agency, as extensions to or of the self in its dealings with a world. But, I am always intrigued 
by the ambiguity of the possessive in expressions such as “university of technology,” or 
“institution of technology.” There is always the possibility of a double reading here, or the 
openness to a closed and decisive encounter with technology and research. AUT may 
certainly be a university whose every mediation is contingent on some techno-practice, 
whose every exchange, undertaking, mode of teaching or research or administration is reliant 
on the techno-prosthetics of extensions to the human. In this it is no different to any other 
university, except possibly in naming this decisive relation where others might actually think 
they are not “applied” in this sense. 
 
But AUT may also be that university in New Zealand, along with a handful elsewhere in the 
world, which recognises that its primary object of enquiry in whatever research it is 
undertaking in whatever discipline or sub-discipline, is the extent to which technology is the 
mediating determination of our research frame. This means the necessity to keep the question 
of technology, its instrumentalism and determination continually in frame, precisely as that 
which frames and delivers us to the possibility of questioning. As a university of technology, 
I would suggest this does not simply mean we are primarily concerned with what is termed 
“applied research” or that we are particularly attuned to the professionalisation of research, 
particularly oriented to industry, to the relevancy of a knowledge economy or smart 
industries. It is not that these are not worthy ambitions, and much of what we in fact do very 
well. Rather, I would emphasise in addition, if not in advance, that as a university of 
technology, we have as a orientation to continually question the technological as such and its 
determining role in construing the very framing of our endeavours. 
 
I commenced with a brief mention of Aristotle’s three basic categories of human activity: 
theory, production and practice. I want to conclude by providing something of an update on 
these Aristotelian categories offered by Michel Foucault in his own critical philosophy of 
technology, in what he referred to as “technologies of the self.” He suggests there are three 
modes for the exercise of power, an exercise of power that is productive of selves. One is 
discourses of power, which are supposedly rational and explanatory of the world, equivalent 
in a sense to Aristotle’s “theory.” You are listening to a discourse. You are assuming that the 
speaker is speaking the true, that what he is presenting, while contestable, is supposedly 
rational and supportable. It has been supposedly thought through as relevant and topical for 
the event we are sharing today. While it is not overtly referential as a presentation, its author 
could provide you with a broad range of critical writings on technology to support his 
position.   
 
There are, secondly, for Foucault technologies of power, that are productive of or enabling for 
human design, roughly equivalent to Aristotle’s “poiesis” or production. This opening 
address happens somewhere, in a room that frames us all and discloses a technology of 
power in its design. My presentation was “written” on an IBM ThinkPad and my delivery 
was enhanced by an audio prosthetic. I cannot begin to separate out the multiple framings of 
technological interventions that produce this event itself. It didn’t just happen, nor is it the 
transparent vehicle for the pure meaning of discourse. Technologies of power in their tele-
functioning establish the locus from which I am able to speak as well as the reciprocal locus 
from which you can speak.  
 
 And there are what Foucault calls “practices” of power. Now, unlike discourses and 
technologies of power, practices are neither rational nor consistent: they are tactics that use 
discourses and technologies even against themselves. Practices of power are partial, 
incomplete and will fail but be recouped every time via the rationality of discourses and 
technologies. Practices of power, in this sense are wild and aberrant. This presentation again 
is not the disclosure of the full meaning of what I would want to have rationally delivered. 
What I actually wrote is a partial engagement with what might have been said otherwise; it is 
tactical rather than complete. And who can say what you actually heard, what you may or 
may not remember, what fragments will resonate with you or leave you indifferent. Who can 
say how it will make sense with respect to what follows or will simply be an introduction 
now out of the way, finished with. Perhaps this is how we need to approach this Aristotelian 
category of praxis. Who in their research has not experienced the aberration and wildness of 
practice; who has not has recourse to reign in and salvage one’s small experiments in thinking 
by the rational discourses of others? If we maintain something like this perspective on praxis, 
perhaps the hyphenated techno-praxis does not necessarily infer the instrumental determinacy 
of techno-rationalism. But, then, along with Foucault, we would face other risks, perhaps 
more pleasurable and possibly more threatening. For, in the recognition that practices of 
power use the rationality of discourses and technologies to their own ends, we realise, along 
with Foucault, that in research it is indeed that it is not that everything is interesting but that 
everything is dangerous. 
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